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 “Dear Mr. President: This is to draw attention to the cases of a group of colleagues of ours, 
historians well known in the academic community, all of whom are now in prison...Every scholar 
has a vested interest in this matter. Faithfully, Hannah Arendt”  
Letter to Augusto Pinochet, November 27, 1974, writing at the urging of an Amnesty 
International chapter in Brusselsi 
 
“Dear Dr. Kissinger: We noted with pleasure the implication in your conversation with Mr. 
Moyers that you are actively intervening in the release of political prisoners in Chile. We cannot 
completely agree that public knowledge of the fact would be detrimental in its success – after all 
you just have publicized it – and we cannot help but feel that in view of our dismal record in 
recent times on matters of human rights, a whiff of humanitarianism might earn us friends in the 
moral community. But in any case we look forward to news of actual releases in Chile, where 
our information is that the treatment of prisoners grows daily more horrendous. Yours sincerely,  
Arthur C. Danto, Professor of Philosophy, and Ainslie Embree, Professor of History and 
Associate Dean, School of International Affairs”  
Letter to Henry Kissinger, January 24, 1975ii 
 
In her now classic history of human rights, Lynn Hunt describes what she calls the 
“promise” of the rights of man, a promise which, she claims, “can be denied, suppressed, or just 
remain unfulfilled, but...does not die.”iii While her critics rightly take issue with her claim that 
rights have a “logic,” their fulfillment a certain inevitability, they themselves also make use of 
the language of promise-making, accepting Hunt’s description of Enlightenment rights 
commitments but disputing whether later moments are in fact making claims, in a conceptually 
coherent way, against those particular earlier promises. Even Hunt’s most vocal detractor, 
Samuel Moyn, refers to the “broken promises” of human rights, arguing that anticolonial 
movements should not be considered part of the history of human rights because they opted to 
draw not on that promise, but on a different one: that of collective liberation. He agrees with 
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Hunt that universal promises are open to claims for fulfillment; he differs from her in thinking 
that such claims are inevitable, emphasizing that later actors have more agency than her account 
suggests. He writes: “The case of the decolonizing world shows clearly that not all universalistic 
promises spark seizures from below of their unrealized potential.”iv  
Behind the Hunt-Moyn debate is not just a disagreement about continuity or 
discontinuity, long versus short history, but a question of how promises enable or foreclose later 
forms of claim-making, how promises operate in time to open or shut off spaces of political 
possibility. Posed this way, the issue appears as one not just of history, but of political theory. 
Along these lines, I propose we re-approach the question of how later claims relate to earlier 
promises by reconsidering the category of the “promise” itself. Rather than think about promises 
in terms of their initial truncation and later extension, or their non-fulfillment followed by 
“seizure from below,” we might think of one promise following on another, as a repeated 
practice in which later promises revise aspects of what came before. This provides an alternative 
to viewing later moments as either claims against previous ones, attempts at augmentation or 
fulfillment, or as wholly separate and discontinuous with that past. Instead, new promises seek to 
recast the past, altering its legacies so as to project new futures.  
To theorize the “promise,” I make use of Arendt’s classic discussion of “promise 
making” as a political practice, and its relationship to the uncertainty of action, in The Human 
Condition.v I understand “promise” here as an attempt to make a space of appearance endure in 
time, to project a possible future amid uncertainty. To develop this, I read Arendt’s account of 
promise-making together with Arthur Danto’s discussion of the philosophy of history, and in 
particular what he terms “narrative sentences,” in order to emphasize the uncertainty not just of 
the future, but of the past, and the ways in which political actors might revise the past itself, and 
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so alter its legacies. My reading allows us to better understand what Arendt means about the 
“uncertainties” of action against which promising secures us: I propose that this uncertainty is 
not just a matter of unforeseen consequences; what’s more, it is not just uncertainty about the 
future. It is also uncertainty about the past: about how the past will matter for the present and for 
the future. In making promises, political actors narrate the past in order to contest its meaning for 
their present, to project possibilities for the future, and so to render certain futures possible. 
Promises reference and narrate the past not because it is fixed, but because it isn’t; in this way, 
promises manifest freedom.  
This has implications for how we, as theorists and historians, narrate the history of human 
rights, and what sort of future we project when we do so. Approaching human rights in the way I 
propose offers a way of narrating the history of human rights that avoids both romanticism and 
reduction. We can think of Hunt as telling a particularly romantic version of human rights 
history, figuring the redemption of human rights promises as not only possible but inevitable.vi 
Moyn’s account, in contrast, is so relentlessly realistic that it risks being reductive, risks missing 
the political potential present in certain promises. In considering anticolonial movements, Moyn 
claims that actors chose between two alternative conceptual traditions – as though these were 
fixed, and as though their nonfulfillment was somehow incidental to the ideals themselves. He 
neglects the alternative possibilities present in those movements, possibilities both for alternative 
futures and for alternative pasts. Responding to concerns about the very possibility of fulfillment, 
about the ways in which promises themselves have been bound up, conceptually and historically, 
with their own nonfulfillment, actors sought not merely to fulfill but to alter conceptual legacies, 
to change the past and so initiate new projects. Similarly, looking to the 1970s, Moyn identifies a 
moment in which new ideas of human rights appeared, only to reduce those ideas to what their 
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political ramifications ultimately were, rather than consider what they could have been – what 
other possible futures those ideas contained, and what other versions of the past. While this may 
not make for bad history, it misses something important about politics.vii In contrast, treating 
promises as political acts in which people attempt to narrate their own history and future, without 
any guarantees of fixity, allows us to consider the ways in which various moments in human 
rights history relate to each other, while emphasizing openness and uncertainty.  
To demonstrate and expand on this, I turn in the second half of the paper to the version of 
human rights politics that Moyn diagnoses as coming to prominence in the 1970s, and that he 
associates in particular with Amnesty International – a human rights politics in which Danto 
himself participated, as did, more peripherally, Arendt. I draw on archival research to reconstruct 
Danto’s role in Amnesty, his political commitments, and the intersection of his politics with his 
philosophy. Here, I hope to further develop the concept of promise-making, and the way it 
appears in history not as an unfolding of the logic of human rights, or a spread of enlightenment 
principles, but rather as a highly contingent and contested process that involves acknowledgment 
but also often disavowal, the emergence of spaces of appearance as well as their closure. Where 
historians often use Amnesty as proof of the bankruptcy of contemporary human rights politics, 
my understand of human rights history offers us a way to view this moment for what was 
valuable in it – without either reducing it to what came after or treating it as an extension of what 
came before. I argue that, for some of those involved, it may in fact have involved a kind of 
human rights promise-making, one directed empire and triumphal narratives of progress – 
directed, that is, against the very disavowals of history and politics that, its critics charge, it 
nonetheless ultimately enabled.  
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Part I: Arendt, Danto, and the Politics of Promises 
A. Re-Founding Narratives of the History of Human Rights 
Perhaps the most straightforward version of the history of human rights begins from 
promises of human rights in the French and American declarations, and then tells a story of those 
promises’ gradual fulfillment. While not initially fulfilled, the story goes, the fact of these 
promises allowed those denied rights, or denied recognition of rights, grounds on which to make 
rights claims. On Lynn Hunt’s account, the abstraction of the initial promises, combined with the 
rise in practices of empathy, made rights vulnerable to claiming from below.  
Hunt seems to take this a bit far in places, as Moyn has criticized, suggesting that rights 
have an “internal logic” that rolls out like a “bulldozer.”viii At the same time, even Moyn agrees 
that if we drop the notion of a kind of destiny or teleology to universalist notions of rights, we 
can still see that “in the revolutionary era, universalistic concepts had ‘cascade’ effects as 
unintended actors claimed them”; that the abstraction inherent in notions of universal rights 
allowed people to make claims, and granted those claims a certain strategic value. And, as 
discussed above, in the moments which Moyn claims are not in fact moments of true human 
rights movements, his argument is often that they are not moments where fulfillment is being 
demanded, again implying a promise-and-fulfillment model.ix  
There are reasons to be uncomfortable with this narrative of human rights history. One 
has to do with the view it provides of those early, foundational promises. While both Hunt and 
Moyn underscore the non-inclusiveness of the American Declaration, they also treat its 
exclusions as a separate issue from its universalist principles. Doing this misses the ways in 
which the Declaration’s ideals and words were themselves tied up with various forms of 
exclusion. More importantly, it also fails to give later claims their due, taking them to be 
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pointing out hypocrisy, decrying a failure to live up to stated principles, rather than revising and 
reformulating those core principles themselves.  
Just how abstract and open the Declaration’s principles were is, at the very least, subject 
to debate. Other scholars have emphasized the ways in which nonfulfillment can in fact be 
understood as intrinsic to the Declaration’s principles themselves. Perhaps most notably, Aziz 
Rana argues that the Declaration should be understood as a defense of settler colonialism. The 
Declaration was provoked, on his account, by a changing British view of American colonists, 
and a growing tendency to treat them not as citizen settlers, but as themselves colonial subjects. 
On this reading, the Declaration was in fact a defense not of abstract universal freedom, but of an 
earlier model of colonialism. The notion of freedom it enshrined was very particular: that of a 
land-owning homesteader. Realizing such freedom, Rana argues, necessarily relied on forms of 
internal and external colonization. If this is so, the openness and abstraction of the Declaration’s 
principles cannot simply be taken for granted, and any politics of “claim-making” would require 
close scrutiny to the ways in which those principles might be caught up with forms of exclusion 
and domination.x  
One does not have to view the ideals of the Declaration as inherently exclusionary, 
however, to question their availability as a basis for appeal. This is evident in the role of the 
Declaration’s principles in African American political thought, where questions about the nature 
of the hypocrisy involved in their non-fulfillment are particularly central and complex. Related to 
the question of whether the Declaration’s principles themselves enabled, or even required, forms 
of domination is the question of whether those ideals were truly held and believed by white 
Americans, but simply not enacted, or whether they were never believed at all, but merely 
pronounced. Robert Gooding-Williams describes this as a central fault line among those who 
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seek to formulate a politics to counter white supremacy, dividing, in particular, W.E.B. DuBois 
from Frederick Douglass. Drawing on Douglass’s speech “What to the Slave is the Fourth of 
July,” Gooding-Williams argues that Douglass considers non-fulfillment a problem of 
“hypocrisy” – understood as a conflict between what was said and what was in fact believed. On 
Gooding-Williams’ reading, Douglass viewed American founding promises as having been 
sincerely held by their original authors, but claimed that the white “sons” did not take them up, 
did not in fact believe in those principles. Gooding-Williams associates the alternative account of 
hypocrisy, what he terms the “anomaly” version, with DuBois; on this view, the problem is not 
insincerity of belief, but a conflict between belief and action, principle and practice. The choice 
between these two views, of course, has major consequences for what sort of politics one thinks 
is necessary, what sorts of claims can and should be made.xi 
Along similar lines, Paul Gilroy describes what he terms the “politics of fulfillment” as a 
red thread running through African American political thought from Alexander Crummel 
forward, focused on the question of the possibility of the fulfillment of foundational American 
promises. This is, he argues, the question that in fact underlies the debate about separatism 
versus assimilation, though it rarely yields a straightforward answer.xii To reduce the politics of 
fulfillment to simply a demand that promises be fulfilled would be overly reductive; to reduce it 
to a demand for self-determination would mean missing its animating tensions.  
Gooding-Williams describes Douglass’s approach as a politics of “re-founding,” a 
politics compatible with the view that white Americans do not truly subscribe to their proclaimed 
ideals, that the principles themselves must be renewed through a kind of “moral 
transformation.”xiii Gooding-Williams reads, in Douglass, several moments in which he enacted 
his own “declarations of independence”; in the language of this paper, we might say that 
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Douglass was engaged in his own practice of promising-making. Such promises are not 
necessarily either separatist or assimilationist. Rather, they initiate new projects precisely by 
offering new narratives of the past, and so continue to change the significance of that past as it 
persists in the present. In this sense, projects of re-founding are compatible with a view that sees 
certain past promises as intrinsically caught up with their own apparent nonfulfillment, a view 
that understands how America’s foundational ideals have also enabled slavery and racial 
domination. This should not mark them as either appeals for fulfillment, or as separate from and 
outside the history of those earlier promises. 
Forms of narration and re-founding, contests over how to narrate the past, are not unique 
to those seeking to resist its exclusions. In the mid-twentieth century, such efforts at narrative are 
evident both in the mainstream version of human rights politics epitomized by the Four 
Freedoms speech and the writing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in more 
radical human rights politics, particularly politics directed against white supremacy and 
colonialism (the moments Moyn describes as involving not human rights but self-determination). 
Mary Ann Glendon summarizes this, and in a sense performs it, when she writes: “The 
Declaration [UDHR] marked a new chapter in a history that began with the great charters of 
humanity’s first rights moment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The British Bill of 
Rights of 1689, the US Declaration of Independence of 1776, and the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789...gave rise to the modern language of rights.”xiv Presiding 
over the 1948 meeting of the UN General Assembly at which the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was adopted, in Paris, René Cassin invoked 1789 and the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen, and “the long struggle for the rights of man” (le long combat pour les 
droits de l’homme) of which the meeting was, he claimed, only the latest stage.xv At the same 
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time, in the opening chapter of the NAACP’s 1947 petition “An Appeal to the World: A 
Statement on the Denial of Human Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent 
in the United States of America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress,” which had 
been submitted to the drafting committee of the UDHR, DuBois cites “the high and noble words” 
of America, “a nation which boldly declared ‘That all men are created equal,’” and which, he 
went on to argue, was failing to live up to those core promises.xvi We see, on both sides, attempts 
to narrate the past, to describe and influence its meaning, in order to project a particular future. 
The period from the late 1940s to the early 1960s involved many moments of founding 
and re-founding, especially as decolonization proceeded. Actors in this period did not simply 
choose between a language of human rights and a language of self-determination; rather, the 
question of self-determination was intimately tied up with questions of the possibilities of 
fulfillment. This is illustrated, for instance, in recent work on federationism. Gary Wilder 
provides an account of the idea of a federation to follow the French empire in the work of Aimé 
Césaire and Léopold Sédar Senghor. Senghor, on Wilder’s telling, proposed neither an 
incorporation of Senegal into France, nor separation from France entirely, but rather that “by 
taking literally the constitution’s language about the Fourth Republic as a union of peoples,” they 
might achieve “a type of integration that would reconstitute France itself.”xvii Such claims are not 
properly understood as claims for fulfillment. Rather, they were themselves moments of 
promise-making, marking out spaces of appearance in a sea of uncertainty about both the 
relevance of the past and prospects for the future. Viewed as such, we can understand them not 
as augmenting past political projects, but as initiating their own, and thereby altering the 
significance and meaning of past promises in the present. To elaborate what it means to 
understand these as moments of promise-making, and to get clear on how promises in particular, 
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as opposed to contests over historical legacies in general, might in fact change the past and 
secure possibilities for the future, I turn here to Arendt’s discussion of promise-making, and to 
Danto’s discussions of history.  
 
 
B. Reading Arendt on Action and its Frustrations 
Contemporary political theorists have made use of Arendt’s account of action, and her 
related account of power, to describe a practice of politics that is ongoing and agonistic, not 
oriented toward rule but rather based in an understanding of non-sovereignty, including an 
ontological rejection of the idea of a sovereign rights-bearing subject.xviii In turning to Arendt to 
understand promise-making, I share many of these motivations, though I want to develop a 
reading that is more attentive to the temporal aspect of action as she describes it, and so more 
attentive to how action endures in time. This reading offers, I claim, a more robust account of 
what Arendt means about the “uncertainties” of action, and unites an understanding of promises 
with an understanding of how we narrate their histories.  
For Arendt, action is a central category of what she terms the vita activa. It is 
differentiated from the other two categories, labor and work, as “the only activity that goes on 
directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter.” Action, she continues, 
“corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth 
and inhabit the world.”xix Action’s definition is grounded in the claim that there are beings, not 
Being, that existence is always plural. It is this condition of plurality that provides the possibility 
of politics. 
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 Plurality, on Arendt’s account, involves both equality and distinctiveness, and as a result, 
action is premised both on an act of disclosure that brings forth something new, and on an 
equality that makes that disclosure possible. Equality, she continues, allows people to understand 
each other and anticipate each other’s needs and wants across historical time; distinctiveness, 
however, means that such understanding is not automatic, that action and speech are required. 
Here, action and speech are more than “signs and sounds”: they transmit not only “immediate, 
identical needs and wants,” but something more. Action and speech involve one’s particular 
ability to initiate, to begin something new. Such beginning is something we do purely on our 
own initiative; it is not, she claims, something, like labor or work, that we have to do out of 
necessity or concerns about utility.xx Uniqueness is tied in this way to natality; taking initiative, 
starting something new, is, on Arendt’s description, a “response” to the fact of birth.  
 When writing about Arendt’s account of action, many readers focus on the “threefold 
frustration of action” she describes, reading it as part of her broader claims about non-
sovereignty. I want to return to the passages in which Arendt discusses action’s frustration, while 
attending closely to the temporal aspects of action and of uncertainty. My worry is that some 
contemporary readings interpret action’s frustration as some version of a ‘law of unintended 
consequences,’ and so miss or mischaracterize an important part of the argument: her point about 
action’s temporality. This matters for Arendt’s understanding of promising, which, on my 
reading, secures us against action’s frustration by creating a “space of appearance,” to use her 
term, that persists in time.  
Arendt’s central explanation of action’s frustration contains the first clue that action’s 
frustration has something to do with time, and with the telling of history. She writes: 
“Exasperation with the threefold frustration of action—the unpredictability of its outcome, the 
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irreversibility of the process, and the anonymity of its authors—is almost as old as recorded 
history.”xxi This can easily be read, especially given the invocation of “unpredictability,” as an 
argument about how action can have ramifications not intended by the actor, and so elude 
control. Amy Allen seems to tell such a story when she explicates the frustration of action in this 
way: “action in the public, political realm[’s]…outcome is unpredictable, so it tends to produce 
unintended effects; as a result of this, once an action has been initiated, it is irreversible; and, as a 
result of these first two characteristics, the author of an action is often unknown.”xxii While not 
incorrect, this doesn’t capture the depth of Arendt’s claim, and in particular does not describe 
what makes this frustration unique to action. It also doesn’t capture the threefold nature of the 
frustration, but instead prioritizes the unpredictability of the outcome, treating irreversibility and 
the anonymity of the author as consequences thereof. Arendt is not simply saying that the world 
is complex and unpredictable, that the implications of our actions often exceed our intent – that 
much could be said for the implications of our work or labor as well. Action’s frustration goes to 
the core of what action is: that it brings forth something new, that it reveals us as unique and 
equal beings. 
 It is this revelation of the actor that brings out the dual passivity and activity, non-
sovereignty coupled with agency, at the core of Arendt’s understanding of action. Arendt writes:  
 
This revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with 
others and neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer human togetherness. Although 
nobody knows whom he reveals when he discloses himself in deed or word, he must be 
willing to risk the disclosure, and this neither the doer of good works, who must be 
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without self and preserve complete anonymity, nor the criminal, who must hide himself 
from others, can take upon themselves.xxiii 
 
Both good works and criminal acts involve unintended consequences, but neither, it would seem, 
qualifies as action. Action, and the threefold frustration that characterizes it, instead has to do 
with being with others, a condition in which it is not simply something about other people’s 
intents that might elude us, but something about ourselves, something about what we would 
expose when we disclose ourselves, through action, to others. Action involves revealing or 
disclosing oneself, a disclosure that exceeds our capacities for knowledge and control. 
 Bonnie Honig, in her Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, describes 
action’s frustration in terms that risk sounding similar to Allen’s. After describing promising and 
forgiving as establishing “partial” areas of stability in which “lasting political communities” 
might be formed, as “promising binds some to others, in time, and forgiving empowers those 
bonds to survive,” Honig worries that these communities would be endangered by the 
contingency of the world and of action in it. If promising, like all action, is “terribly risky 
because it takes place in a contingent world where its meaning and consequences are always 
underdetermined if not indeterminate,” how can promising also secure against such risks? She 
sets this up as a kind of dilemma: either promising can create stability, because action is not “as 
risky, as contingent and unpredictable, as Arendt says it is,” or action is in fact contingent and 
risky, and promising could not secure us against this. Honig points to this as a central paradox 
for Arendt, one that is constitutive and in some sense irresolvable.xxiv  
Others look at this alleged paradox and instead see contradiction. In Democracy in 
Question, Alan Keenan describes Arendt’s account as “caught between freedom and 
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foundation,” arguing that promising “oscillates essentially between these two poles.” His 
concern is that, for promising to provide security, it must be “foundational,” and so limit later 
“free” acts because they are bound by that security. He writes: “Promising can effectively lay 
down the law of freedom only by immediately violating that same law: it is a free act that at once 
makes less than fully free all acts that follow its law and example.” For promising to secure us 
against uncertainty, it would also secure us against our own freedom, a freedom that arises 
precisely from non-sovereignty.xxv 
Behind both Keenan’s and Honig’s views is an understanding of the future as uncertain 
and contingent, and the past as fixed and stable. But what if, rather than view the past as fixed 
and the future as uncertain, we treat history itself as uncertain? The freedom of action has to do 
not just with the future, but with the way the significance of action unfolds over time. This is a 
more radical reading of Arendt as a philosopher of history: her claim goes beyond the idea that 
the future isn’t yet known, questioning the very notion of historical knowledge and the fixity of 
past action.  
To develop this, we might read Arendt together with Arthur Danto on the philosophy of 
history; here, I have in mind Danto’s argument that history is not simply a chronicle of past 
events, but a story about significance. Describing what he terms “narrative sentences,” Danto 
suggests that the past is not as fixed as we commonly take it to be, the future perhaps not as 
plastic. Narrating history requires not only knowledge of the past, but knowledge of the future, 
without which we cannot have a sense of beginnings and endings and so cannot have stories.xxvi 
Yet in the present, we have no such knowledge of the future. Acting in the present, then, means 
directing oneself toward a future that is unknown, and so not knowing the significance of what 
one does, what story one is engaged in. Danto’s claim thus goes beyond the idea that we do we 
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not know the future, arguing that we also do not know the past, or even the present. In the terms 
Arendt used, we might consider the “exasperation” that is “as old as recorded history” to be an 
exasperation with the task of writing narrative sentences, with describing a past as though it is 
fixed when in fact it is anything but, with attempting to adjudicate beginnings and endings. It is 
as old as recorded history because it concerns the recording of history.xxvii  
 So does a promise, in announcing a beginning and attempting to secure a future, limit 
future acts? Does it, in Keenan’s terms, lay down the law? I take Arendt, read with Danto, to be 
saying something different. Making a promise can be understood as a “founding” only later; at 
the time, it may assert a beginning and initiate a space of appearance, but the significance of that 
foundation, even its status as foundation, is constituted only in retrospect. When later promises 
make reference to moments of foundation and make claims about their significance, they are not 
in this way bound by that past, but are in fact exercising freedom over it. For moments of 
foundation to succeed, and so to have some purchase on the future, we have to read the past in a 
particular way, to participate in that past action and in the ongoing determination of its 
significance. Meaning and significance is not contained in what might retrospectively be viewed 
as the moment of beginning, but is part of how that action unfolds over time. Foundations are not 
moments of fixity, against which future claims can be made; rather, the meaning of those 
foundations is itself still unfolding.xxviii  
For Arendt, the issue is not just that action can only come to be known after the fact, but 
that action itself continues beyond the moment of any single deed. Action endures and extends 
across time. She writes: 
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The strength of the action process is never exhausted in a single deed but, on the contrary, 
can grow while its consequences multiply; what endures in the realm of human affairs are 
these processes, and their endurance is as unlimited, as independent of the perishability of 
material and the mortality of men as the endurance of humanity itself. The reason why we 
are never able to foretell with certainty the outcome and end of any action is simply that 
action has no end. The process of a single deed can quite literally endure throughout time 
until mankind itself has come to an end.xxix  
 
Action is potentially unending, not circumscribed to a moment or to the durability of a thing or 
even a life. Its unpredictability, irreversibility, and anonymity are the result of this temporal 
character.  
Action’s unpredictability, then, is not simply a matter of an inability to accurately model 
all possible outcomes, but instead refers to the fact that the meaning of actions is not contained in 
a single moment. As Arendt puts it, “This is not simply a question of inability to foretell all the 
logical consequences of a particular act, in which case an electronic computer would be able to 
foretell the future.”xxx Danto also rejects the idea of simply correcting an account of the past 
based on later unforeseen outcomes, which he writes “is just the sort of thing a machine could 
do,” but is not in fact the task of the historian.xxxi Instead, Arendt writes that “the light that 
illuminates processes of action, and therefore all historical processes, appears only at their end” 
and that “action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller.”xxxii This story, the meaning that action 
reveals, is part of action itself, part of what it discloses, and yet comes after the deed. 
Arendt’s storyteller and Danto’s historian call to mind Hegel’s Owl of Minerva, flying 
only at dusk. For Danto, Hegel’s claim holds what he calls a “melancholy truth.”xxxiii The 
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aphorism tells us about the impossibility of knowing one’s own present – that “to live in a period 
is not necessarily to be in a favored position for appreciating the quality of life that defines it.” 
He likens this to the phenomenon of “Other Minds,” writing that, as with minds, “there is no 
privileged access to the interior of a period on the part of those whose period it is,” because 
“access to the interiors of periods is achieved not by some sort of reflex act...but refracted back 
through the knowledge of other periods.”xxxiv Yet this also makes the experience of living in a 
certain period incomprehensible to those in the future, because “not knowing how it is all going 
to end is the mark of living through events.”xxxv In this way, other periods might really be other. 
And in this sense, contra Verstehen approaches to history, which aim to fully understand a period 
as it was experienced, Danto claims that the task of the historian is to tell a story.xxxvi 
In some general sense, of course, we cannot change the past – as Danto writes, “For some 
centuries there has been no opportunity to morally re-educate the Borgias so as to make the 
statement ‘The Borgias were decent folk’ come out true.” And yet, he claims, “there is a sense in 
which we may speak of the Past as changing...because the event at [time] 1 comes to stand in 
different relationships to events that occur later.”xxxvii To say, following one of Danto’s favorite 
examples of a narrative sentence, “The Thirty Years War began in 1618,” does not describe the 
experience of 1618, but rather tells a story. Such sentences stand as “descriptions under which 
the events of which they are true could not have been observed.”xxxviii  
For Arendt as well, this is not a radical skepticism about the possibility of historical truth, 
but rather a question of how we come to know that truth, how we make sense of it. On her 
account, as she elaborates in her essay “Truth and Politics,” there are certain aspects of the past 
that are given, that are true, and that cannot and should not be reshaped by ideology. The task of 
the historian is not to create reality, but to reconcile us to it; this makes history distinct from 
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ideology. And yet the story of which the past is part is not something that inheres in that 
moment; it is visible only later, to the storyteller.xxxix 
 
C. Forgiving and Promising  
 I want to return to what Arendt means by promising and forgiving, and their relation to 
the uncertainty of action, to get clear on what it is that is distinctive about promises in particular. 
Forgiving, which is retrospective, and promising, which is prospective, provide security against 
the uncertainties of action past or future, allowing action to endure in time. Forgiving and 
promising are part of Arendt’s answer to the question she poses of “whether the capacity for 
action does not harbor within itself certain potentialities which enable it to survive the disabilities 
of non-sovereignty.”xl She attributes to forgiving and promising the ability to preserve the 
potential for action: by allowing action to survive its own frustrations, and by allowing people to 
stay together even without physical proximity, they make action possible. 
Arendt presents forgiving and promising explicitly as faculties that counteract the 
frustrations of action and preserve the relationships between people. She writes: 
 
The possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of being unable to 
undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was 
doing—is the faculty of forgiving. The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic 
uncertainty of the future, is contained in the faculty to make and keep promises. The two 
faculties belong together in so far as one of them, forgiving, serves to undo the deeds of 
the past, whose ‘sins’ hang like Damocles’ sword over every new generation; and the 
other, binding oneself through promises, serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, 
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which the future is by definition, islands of security without which not even continuity, 
let alone durability of any kind, would be possible in the relationships between men.xli  
 
But what does it mean that forgiving actually undoes the deeds of the past? This claim makes 
sense only given a very particular understanding of what constitutes a deed. If we think of action 
in the usual way, it would seem one could forgive but not in fact undo (hence the logic of 
“forgiving but not forgetting”) – particularly given what she told us earlier about action’s 
‘irreversibility.’ We would expect that forgiving might absolve us of guilt, or allow us to account 
for past missteps, but not in fact take back the action itself.  
But if we conceive of action as revealing us as people, if we think of it as how we appear 
in the public realm, then forgiving would have more purchase. It might even, as Arendt claims, 
be able to undo a past act – in that it could undo, or at least alter, an aspect of our appearance. 
Put another way, if we think of action not as confined to a moment in time, but as extending 
forward, beyond even the lifetime of the doer – if, that is, we think of it as Arendt thinks of it – 
then forgiving certainly can undo an action, precisely by revising it.xlii After all, that action is not 
entirely in the past, but exists in the present and future as well. As Danto suggests, perhaps the 
past is more plastic than we generally take it to be. 
 Similarly, where forgiving counteracts irreversibility, Arendt claims that promising 
counteracts uncertainty. Making and keeping promises appear as a single faculty, one that allows 
for continuity in the relationships among people. Promising carves out durability in our relations 
with one another, allows us to project a current set of relationships, or space of appearance, into 
the future. To pick up on an earlier theme, we can add that the very fact of the preservation of 
such a space – or the possibility for preservation – is itself what constitutes the promise. This has 
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more to do with a relationship among people than with the utterance of a particular phrase. The 
initial promissory statement (if there is such a statement) does not in itself constitute the 
“promise” any more than the enunciation of wedding vows might be said to, on its own, 
constitute a “marriage” (to use a classic example of performative statements involving 
promising). In both cases, what is at stake is an ongoing relationship between people, a way of 
showing up for one another.xliii Ideally, this does not limit one’s freedom in the future, but 
instead makes one more free. 
 Forgiving and promising are so profoundly intersubjective for Arendt that she claims – 
contrary to our everyday, common language usage – that one can only forgive or make promises 
to another, and not to oneself. She writes: 
 
Without being bound to the fulfilment of promises, we would never be able to keep our 
identities; we would be condemned to wander helplessly and without direction in the 
darkness of each man’s lonely heart, caught in its contradictions and equivocalities—a 
darkness which only the light shed over the public realm through the presence of others, 
who confirm the identity between the one who promises and the one who fulfils, can 
dispel. Both faculties, therefore, depend on plurality, on the presence and acting of others, 
for no one can forgive himself and no one can feel bound by a promise made only to 
himself; forgiving and promising enacted in solitude or isolation remain without reality 
and can signify no more than a role played before one’s self.xliv 
 
Promising, by making us visible to each other, makes us visible also to ourselves: it binds our 
current selves to our future selves, creating continuity in our identities. Strikingly, this continuity 
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is not visible, not illuminated – even to ourselves – absent the ability to make and keep promises. 
Without the faculty of promising, we would be left with contradictions and equivocalities in our 
very sense of who we are, discontinuities in our understanding of our own identities. Promising 
and forgiving secure a space of appearance among people that runs across time. 
 In his book Omens of Adversity, on the legacies of the Grenada Revolution, David Scott 
also picks up on the role of forgiving and promising, and particularly forgiving, in relationship to 
the uncertainties of action that Arendt describes. Scott’s book is helpful for its description of the 
way in which changing one’s present relationship to a past tragedy, a failed revolution, might 
change the possibilities for action. On his telling, in October 1983, the Grenada revolution “self 
destructed”: Maurice Bishop and other leaders of the popular revolutionary government were 
assassinated, replaced by military rule; the US invaded several days later. The lack of clarity 
about what happened to Bishop and the others, and in particular the fact that, after the US 
invasion, 18 former members of the government and military were charged with the killing, and 
yet the bodies were never found, “ruined a generation’s experience of time—that is, it destroyed 
the temporality constitutive of the organization of political hope and future-oriented expectation 
through which a generation lived.” The dashed promise of the revolution made action in the 
present impossible. A notion of time as progressive, involving successive dialectical 
overcomings, instead gave way to melancholic repetition of loss, “an ending that could not be 
brought to an end.”xlv 
In places, Scott can seem to reduce action’s frustration to a problem of unintended 
consequences. He explains his concern, in the first chapter of the book, with “the unintended 
tragic consequences of moral agents acting, and colliding, in an expressly political field”; he 
continues: “For Arendt, to act politically in time (which for her is to act disclosively and in 
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freedom) is unavoidably to expose oneself to the potential collision of actions embodying rival 
ends, competing interests.”xlvi But I read Arendt in The Human Condition to be arguing that it is 
action’s disclosive character, its very temporality and the stories we tell – and not the collision of 
different actions, or rival interests, as Scott puts it – that renders action uncertain, and, on his 
terms, tragic. This is a reading in fact, I think, more compatible with Scott’s broader point, in this 
book as well as his earlier Conscripts of Modernity, about the plasticity of the past and the role of 
the storyteller in introducing genre, plot, and meaning.xlvii Indeed, in his example of Grenada, it 
is a re-narration of the past, through an act of forgiveness, that allows for a greater sense of 
possibility for action in the future. The perils related to the uncertainty of action arise not from 
the fact that other people might have other intentions, that other actions might get in our way: 
they arise from an uncertainty about the stories of which we are part, and the fact that action 
exists in time, as part of a story. It is not greater coordination that is required, an attempt to better 
align one’s intentions with those of others. Promising and forgiving appear not as means of 
aligning interests and intents, but as ways of attaching action to ideas of past and future, of 
projecting a story.  
Indeed, Scott, following Arendt, points to forgiveness as one mode for enabling action 
(even while, remembering Honig, it is also itself a kind of action), because it might alter this 
melancholic sense of time. Using the example of a booklet produced by secondary school 
students, Under the Cover of Darkness, which investigated what had happened to those bodies, 
he describes such historical investigation as itself a “performative act.” It is performative, he 
claims, because “it shows that the present can live with the past—even the not entirely resolved 
or resolvable past—in ways other than melancholia and in ways that potentially open the present 
to ethical-political intervention.”xlviii By re-narrating history, changing the meaning of the past 
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for the present through a kind of forgiveness, it enabled ongoing action in the present, creating 
precisely that “future-oriented expectation” that had, on Scott’s account, been lost.  
Promising and forgiving structure our understandings of temporality in the present, and 
so can change our notions of emplotment. In this way, they change the way we live with the past 
and the future, and thus change the prospects for action. More than just re-narrating the past, 
contesting legacies, they bind a particular articulation of historical legacies to a shared 
commitment to the future. They establish relations among people, through a pledge to show up 
for one other, that is premised on a particular version of the past and generates particular 
possibilities for action going forward. It is no surprise, then, that the term is used so often to 
describe foundational rights declarations, the creation of a polity through an act of mutual 
recognition. 
 
PART II: Amnesty International and the Uncertainties of Political Meaning 
A. The Historians’ Consensus on Amnesty International 
I want to jump forward a bit, to the version of human rights ascendant in the 1970s, a 
version that displaced the more radical political aspirations of the 1940s to 1960s. This was a 
time when human rights discourse captured much of the public imagination. Where the earlier 
declarations have been praised for the alleged openness implicit in their abstract notion of 
humanity, in this later case that very openness is often criticized by historians for involving its 
own forms of closure, and for displaying an idealism that distracted from both history and 
politics. On this account, the 1970s represents the beginning of a new and less avowedly political 
version of human rights. Amnesty International, an organization based in London with a network 
of affiliated “chapters” throughout the world, is often singled out as exemplary of this new kind 
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of human rights politics. And yet, I want to show, within the politics surrounding Amnesty 
International we can also see some elements of a different, and potentially more political, form 
of promise-making. 
Turning to this period also lets us approach Arthur Danto’s work from another angle: his 
own involvement in Amnesty. Danto’s profoundly anti-teleological and anti-positivist 
understanding of history is underscored by this involvement, as well as by his broader political 
engagement from the 1960s forward.xlix Looking to his political practice allows us to see more of 
what he describes as the openness, or uncertainty, of action. By offering a more nuanced view of 
Amnesty, an aspect of Amnesty that was more avowedly political, more critical of historical 
injustice, it also allows us to avoid writing Amnesty off as inaugurating a “bad” version of 
human rights politics, and instead attend to what its promise was, as well as to where it fell short. 
In this way, we might re-narrate human rights’ recent history, seeing it now in a manner that is 
less reductive, and more attentive to the forms of freedom implicit in human rights politics.  
The organization was created to help free what it termed “prisoners of conscience” 
around the world – that is, prisoners who had been arrested for political activism, with the caveat 
that they had not advocated violence. Amnesty chapters would “adopt” prisoners, generally 
assigned to them by the London office. Having adopted a prisoner, a group would send letters to 
members of the prisoner’s government, as well as, frequently, to the prisoner directly. They also 
sought to publicize the cases in news media, drawing attention not only to the fact of 
imprisonment, but to the forms of torture and coercion used against prisoners. Amnesty produced 
reports on human rights abuses in particular countries, which did not focus on individual 
prisoners but on broader patterns of maltreatment. Amnesty also, importantly and somewhat 
controversially, prohibited chapters in any country from adopting prisoners in their own country. 
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The organization measured its success in terms of prisoners released, and defined its goal as the 
release of all prisoners of conscience and the fulfillment of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.l  
For historians who point to Amnesty as marking the beginning of a new kind of human 
rights politics, the central charge is that Amnesty International depoliticized human rights. 
Human rights were posited as a pre-political ideal; their fulfillment, the protection of abstract 
humanity, as the end of politics. In The Last Utopia, Samuel Moyn describes Amnesty 
International as inaugurating a new kind of human rights politics; as he puts it: “in the face of 
soiled utopias in politics, a nonpartisan morality existed outside and above them,” a utopian 
vision, with religious roots, that supplanted the more radical visions of political change of the 
1960s.li Barbara Keys reaches a similar assessment of Amnesty International, writing:  
 
Though Amnesty International’s achievements are impossible to measure precisely, the 
organization undoubtedly helped thousands of prisoners, giving them hope, reducing the 
terms of their imprisonment, and providing relief to their families....On a grander scale its 
efforts inspired the world to hold governments accountable for some of the most 
horrifying state-sponsored abuse of individuals. But its efforts inevitably involved 
political trade-offs. Amnesty treated political problems as moral ones, thereby eliding the 
deeper political changes that social justice often required. Focusing on ‘mere’ protection 
of individuals from ‘fundamental wrongs’ ...worked to push politics, as a project of 
collective empowerment, to the sidelines.lii 
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Amnesty’s defense of a pre-political morality, that is, displaced the politics of collective action 
and a broader agenda for justice. As Mark Bradley tells it, Amnesty’s emphasis on “the 
singularity of the person and the body,” its reliance on a language and practice of moral witness 
and testimony, and what he calls “a perpetual concern with performing its own impartiality,” 
helped define its legacy in the generation of a particular American human rights vernacular – one 
characterized by “a conscious indifference to the political and social contexts that produced 
human rights violations in the first place.”liii On Keys’ telling, this fit all too well with the 
broader Cold War politics of the time, allowing Americans an ideal of humanity, associated with 
their supposed founding principles, that distinguished them from the Soviets while also 
obscuring their own involvement in forms of racial and imperial domination, in part by 
supplanting the memory of Vietnam. Oriented around an allegedly apolitical moral category, it 
abstracted away from the very politics within which it intervened. 
It is tempting, following these historical accounts, to point to the 1970s moment as a 
beginning, as the start of a period in which human rights politics took a turn for the worse 
precisely as it captured a broader public imagination. Yet as Bradley emphasizes, the rise of the 
“human rights movement” in the 1970s did not mark something new, but instead the travel and 
blending of different languages for politics. To view it as the start of something, an origin of our 
contemporary human rights politics, would be to miss much of what characterized the experience 
of the time: an uncertainty about possibilities for action. This uncertainty comes to the fore when 
we focus on what might have been valuable in Amnesty’s work, the parts that were directed 
against the very depoliticization the historians describe. Viewed through Danto’s involvement, 
we can see moments in which the kind of activism that comprised Amnesty’s work could also 
involve a critical stance on American claims to exceptionalism and American actions abroad, a 
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concern about the context and cause of abuses, that drew on legacies of the 1960s, and that 
attempted to create a space for politics, precisely by getting people out of prison.  
And yet, the historians’ account is not wrong. Looking at Amnesty, part of what we have 
to understand is how a more avowedly political version of human rights, one that emphasized a 
need for a kind of human rights politics that went beyond humanitarianism and was sensitive to 
issues of historical wrongdoing and imperialism, could nonetheless have contributed to the 
historical rise of the bankrupt form of human rights politics that the historians critique. We have 
to keep in mind, that is, action’s uncertainty – not as a matter of differing agendas, competing 
intentions, but as a lack of control over the story of which one is part, of a mismatch between 
how one’s actions appear to oneself and how they appear in later history. In Amnesty, Danto saw 
the possibility for a certain form of promise-making, one directed against imperial narratives of 
progress and directed toward the creation of more open possibilities for politics. He saw 
Amnesty as part of a story of a resistance to the kinds of abuses exemplified by the US war in 
Vietnam and by French colonialism, a story not of the gradual progress of the French and 
American founding principles, nor of the approach of an abstract utopia, but of resistance to 
existing injustice – a story of activism oriented not around principles of moral witness, but 
around a dogged effort to get people out of prison. And yet – perhaps because of Amnesty’s 
organizational concern with disavowing such politics, an official impartiality that precluded a 
public description of the broken promises of history, requiring instead an appeal to an abstract 
utopian politics – his involvement has become part of a very different story. 
 
B. Arthur Danto and Amnesty International USA 
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 Moyn claims that the view of human rights as “transcending” politics, a view articulated 
forcefully by Peter Benenson, a founder of Amnesty International, defined the creation of 
Amnesty International USA. He writes: “When Columbia University professor Ivan Morris 
founded Amnesty International USA a few years later, and the Riverside chapter began to meet 
in Columbia philosopher Arthur Danto’s living room on the Upper West Side, the impulse 
remained the same: ‘saving the world one individual at a time.’”liv The quotation, Danto’s, 
appears to align with the reduction of politics to the salvation of suffering bodies for which 
Amnesty is criticized – although it is hard not to read the quip, with its strange mixture of 
humility and grandiosity, as at least somewhat tongue in cheek. Beyond this, the description is 
mostly correct: Ivan Morris, a scholar of Japanese literature and a close friend of Danto’s, 
personally and professionally, was heavily involved with Amnesty, both through Amnesty 
International headquarters in London (for which he conducted several investigations and 
authored multiple reports) and as a co-founder of Amnesty International USA.lv The Riverside 
Group began with Morris as the chapter head; Danto took over in 1975, and the group met in his 
apartment and others on Manhattan’s Riverside Drive.lvi Danto and Morris were both members 
of AIUSA’s board, and at times on the board’s executive committee, Danto from the beginning 
of 1972 to late 1975.lvii  
Danto left the Amnesty USA board in part because of rules about how many members of 
one chapter could serve on the board at once, though he also noted that the work of the board 
was never what he was passionate about: it involved some interesting moments, though also 
many thankless ones.lviii The internal politics were also a source of frustration: Danto wrote to 
Morris to express his “unease,” and a concern with “the zeal with which people propose to throw 
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other people overboard,” noting “an appetite for unity and fear of disunity which may in the end 
not over-ride human considerations.”lix  
Not surprisingly, Danto’s passion lay with the work of the Riverside Group itself. 
Formed in 1966, with 12 members, Riverside was a particularly successful Amnesty chapter. 
There was a limit on how many prisoners any individual group could “adopt” at a time; 
Riverside registered as two groups (numbers 3 and 16) in order to double its quota. From its 
beginning to the time Danto stepped down as head in 1978, the group adopted 59 prisoners, 46 of 
whom were released, some more than once (that is, some were adopted, released, re-imprisoned, 
re-adopted, and re-released). Individual group members would take responsibility for each 
adopted prisoner, reporting back on the case at the group’s regular meetings, which took place 
often and lasted for hours.lx Danto took on many cases over the years, from countries including 
Czechoslovakia, Argentina, Spain, South Africa, Chile, and Morocco.lxi  
Hannah Arendt did some letter-writing as well. On the request of an Amnesty 
International chapter in Belgium, she wrote to General Augusto Pinochet and others in the 
Chilean government in November of 1974 to request the release of Luis Vitale and other Chilean 
historians. She cited her interest as a fellow scholar, writing that without “freedom of speech and 
thought...no scholarship is conceivable,” and suggesting that the cases would be of interest to all 
scholars. One can assume that, rather than appealing to Pinochet’s interest in scholarship, she 
meant to underscore the potential for publicity. Vitale was released in the weeks following. She 
also contributed money to Amnesty USA, though appears to have declined an invitation to serve 
on their National Advisory Council.lxii 
In the November 11th, 1972 edition of The New York Times, preserved by Amnesty 
International USA in their official records, Morris wrote an editorial describing the organization 
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and its mission. As he put it: “Prisoners of conscience...exist, to our shame, in almost every 
country of the world except a few exemplary states like Norway and the Netherlands. ...As long 
as such men continue to be persecuted and imprisoned, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights remains what it has been until now—a mockery.”lxiii This description is striking: it sets 
forth a commitment not to abstract humanity, but to making good on the promise of the UDHR. 
It also pointedly lists only two countries as exemplary, Norway and the Netherlands – not the 
United States.  
While Amnesty chapters were officially barred from taking positions on their own 
nation’s politics, and from adopting prisoners in their own nations, this did not amount to 
complete neutrality, as Morris’s omission makes clear. Danto and Embree’s letter to Kissinger, 
sent on Columbia letterhead, chided him for his double-talk and reminded him of the importance 
of securing the release of prisoners. It contains echoes of Amnesty’s strategy in its use of letter 
writing as a tactic, emphasis on publicity, and appeal to principles of humanity and morality. The 
letter had in fact been discussed during a conversation at the Riverside Group’s meeting on 
January 20, 1975, where it was decided that, alongside other efforts, Danto and Embree would 
write to Kissinger, “expressing our gratitude concerning his efforts for Chilean prisoners and 
urging him to do more.”lxiv 
When the US came under criticism for refusing amnesty to Vietnam draft resisters, and 
for its own political prisoners, Amnesty’s American chapters searched for ways to signal their 
opposition to US practices within their official Amnesty roles. During the board meeting at 
which amnesty for draft resisters was discussed, Danto suggested that the group reiterate that 
AIUSA had a policy against taking a position but that the International did have a position, and 
that they repeat what that position was. Barbara Sproul proposed they might act like a 501(c)(4) 
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organization – a concept that seemed obscure and novel at the time – and educate the public on 
what was going on, even without advocating particular actions.lxv  
It was also suggested at that meeting that inquiries be referred to the American Civil 
Liberties Union, which was leading a campaign on amnesty for American draft resisters and 
others. The ACLU campaign included letter writing, Amnesty-style, on the prisoners’ behalf, as 
well as Congressional lobbying and the issuing of public statements. The organization tried to 
enlist Hannah Arendt’s help with this; Arendt does not seem to have signed onto these letters, 
despite being asked, though she did sign onto other letters seeking the release of political 
prisoners as part of International PEN and as a member of the executive board of PEN American 
Center in 1973 and 1974.lxvi She did also describe herself as a member and “a great admirer” of 
the ACLU.lxvii  
 In explaining what motivated him to become involved in Amnesty, Danto describes being 
in Paris in 1961 and 1962, working on what would become Narration and Knowledge, feeling 
apprehensive about “terrorism,” and seeing “bodies, mostly of Algerians, floating in the Seine” 
(presumably referring to the October 17, 1961, Paris Massacre, in which French police killed and 
brutalized protesters, and threw many of their bodies into the river). He writes that the French 
use of torture in this time became the “source” of the “epidemic of torture throughout the Third 
World,” and that “it was especially because of its antitorture campaign that I became active in 
Amnesty International.”lxviii 
 Danto carried over additional memories of the 1960s into his political work in the 1970s, 
particularly his involvement in the protests at Columbia in 1968. He tells how the students, 
occupying Hamilton Hall, called him at home and asked him to come in and discuss things with 
them; he said he would be happy to, but only so 
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hostage.lxix He later served on Columbia’s “Tripartite Commission,” established by Columbia’s 
president to decide how to handle disciplinary proceedings after the protests.lxx There, Danto 
advocated against harsh punishments for the students; while the students were not granted full 
amnesty, they were collectively placed on probation and received no further punishment unless 
that probation was violated (with some individual exceptions).lxxi Danto himself shared the 
students’ opposition to the war in Vietnam and concerns about the relationship between 
Columbia and the largely black and Latino neighborhoods surrounding it. He later chaired a 
committee to review the General Studies program, recommending Columbia create a parallel 
two-year institute for local residents, with additional advising and flexibility in designing a 
major, from which students would be able to transfer into the regular four-year general studies 
program.lxxii And he shared the students’ opposition to a gym Columbia had proposed, and 
started to build, which would have converted a portion of Morningside Park into campus 
property, and would have included separate entrances for university affiliates and those not 
affiliated, most of whom would have been from the surrounding neighborhoods, with the latter 
entrance on a lower level.lxxiii  
 Danto’s personal involvements at Columbia and at Amnesty are similar on several levels. 
At a substantive level, we see a politics that was opposed to American and French imperial 
actions, and racial domination in America, and that saw these as connected to other forms of 
violence abroad. Formally, we also see a politics that was oriented toward enabling other forms 
of political action, be it student protest or the work of “prisoners of conscience” abroad. His 
politics also resonate with his own philosophical commitments: an opposition to a teleological 
history, as though rights just “rolled out” from America and France to the rest of the world, and 
an opposition to historical positivism, endorsing instead the notion that events take on 
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significance over time that the actors involved cannot know. Describing 1968, Danto writes that 
“it took the students themselves by surprise, not realizing what they had started.” He goes on: “I 
learned what it is like to live in history. It is not knowing how things are going to come out.”lxxiv 
 Historians are not entirely wrong in describing a discourse of human rights that came to 
prominence in the 1970s and that, for its focus on individual suffering and its alleged 
nonpartisanship, obscured the political causes of ongoing oppression, emphasizing the salvation 
of the individual over collective liberation, a commitment to abstract morality over the political 
activity of mutual promise-making. And yet, in Danto’s own work, we can see one attempt, 
through Amnesty, to undo some of the harms of an imperial past, to create a space for politics in 
the present, through commitments to show up for people, to advocate for and support them. Even 
as, at times, he used a moral register to describe his aims, as in his letter to Kissinger, this was 
not a morality entirely divorced from politics. For Danto, his involvement was not part of an 
attempt to tell a story of American and French virtue; instead, he was involved in a collaborative 
effort to confront torture and wrongful imprisonment, understood not as moral evils committed 
by ill-intentioned individuals but as parts of the legacies of past wrongs, not as aberrations in the 
path of progress but as outrages that gave the lie to historical teleology. In both his activism and 
his contemporaneous academic writing, he attempted to forge a way of relating to the past, and to 
the future, that would enable freedom in the present in a manner premised not on knowledge and 
control, but on non-sovereignty. And his work helped attend to some of the real impediments to 
political action, the impediments to freely re-making history: the fact of imprisonment and 
brutality, the need for financial support.  
Amnesty’s politics may ultimately have been of a piece with the reclamation of American 
virtue that Keys diagnoses. And yet we should not take Keys’ story as permanently fixed, either. 
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Rather than write off Danto’s activism, we might see in it an attempt to do what he could, to 
forge the conditions for action, amid uncertainty. This is not to say that his approach was perfect, 
that he could not have done more, that other approaches might not have been preferable. But that 
his story could be part of Amnesty International’s story should tell us something, too, about 
Amnesty: that the idea of human rights motivating at least some people involved with Amnesty 
could provide the terms for a shared commitment to politics, rather than to an apolitical morality. 
Such participation could serve as a bulwark against the uncertainties of action, a commitment to 
continue showing up for distant prisoners, and for one another. 
Telling our own histories of human rights, we might think not about continuous legacies, 
or those legacies’ refusal, but rather about the ways in which human rights politics might attempt 
(or fail to attempt) to re-found earlier promises, avoiding the disavowals that came with them. In 
telling histories of human rights, we would do well to refuse the dilemma between a romantic 
emplotment, tracking promises and gradual fulfillments, and a reductive one, dismissing the 
potential of past efforts in light of what followed. And in refusing such a dilemma, we might 
better describe the experience of political action, of not knowing how it will all turn out. 
Attending to the uncertainty of action, and to the ways in which promises to show up for one 
another might attempt to counteract that uncertainty, we might instead emphasize openness, the 
possibility of changing the meaning of the past for the present. Told this way, we might 
understand human rights promises, and claims, neither as the extension or augmentation of 
earlier promises, of earlier forms of human rights politics, nor as clear departures from what 
came before. Instead, we might think about how human rights politics can, or can fail to, critique 
and re-found earlier promises – and can be subject, itself, to critique and re-founding in turn.  
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i Correspondence, Organizations, Amnesty International, Hannah Arendt Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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